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Domestic Relations
Domestic Relations; parent and child relationship
Civil Code §§195, 200, 215, 216, 230, 231, 4453 (repealed);
Part 7 (commencing with §7000) (new); §§196, 196a, 197, 224
(amended); Evidence Code §661 (repealed); §§605, 621, 1310,
1311, 1312, 1313, 1315, 1316 (amended); Health and Safety Code
Article 5 (commencing with §10440) (repealed); §§10450.5,
10456.5 (new); §§10450, 10456 (amended); Probate Code §§255,
256 (repealed); §255 (new); § 1403 (amended).
SB 347 (Beilenson); STATS 1975, Ch 1244
Support: State Bar of California; California National Organization
of Women
Eliminates all statutory references to "legitimacy" and "illegit-
imacy"; provides for criteria to determine and for a procedure to
establish the parent and child relationship without regard to dis-
tinctions based on legitimacy; liberalizes the evidentiary rules gov-
erning the establishment of paternity; grants natural fathers the
right to seek custody of their children when they are relinquished
for adoption by the mothers; grants fathers and children who have
an established parent and child relationship full reciprocal inher-
itance rights without regard to the marital status of the father and
mother.
With certain exceptions, Chapter 1244 has incorporated into Califor-
nia law the provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act as approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1973 [NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEET-
ING IN ITS EIGHTY-SECOND YEAR, JULY 26-AUGUST 2, 1973, Uniform
Parentage Act, at 339-358 (hereinafter cited as National Uniform Par-
entage Act)]. Part 7 (commencing with §7000) has been added to the
Civil Code and is designated the "Uniform Parentage Act." The major
purpose of the Uniform Parentage Act is to provide for substantive legal
equality of children regardless of the marital status of their parents. The
rights and responsibilities of children in relation to their parents and of
parents in relation to their children have been equalized without refer-
ence to the marital status of the parents, and each parent has been given
equal rights and responsibilites without regard to sex.
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Establishment of Parent and Child Relationship
In place of the previous distinction between "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" as legal labels for children based upon the marital status of the
child's parents, Chapter 1244 has substituted a legal concept called the
"parent and child relationship." This relationship may exist between
a child and his or her natural or adoptive parents. It is established be-
tween the natural mother and the child by proof that she gave birth to
the child, and between adoptive parents and the child by proof of adop-
tion [CAL. Civ. CODE §7003 (hereinafter all section number references
will be to the Civil Code, unless otherwise specified)].
In the case of an alleged father there are two methods for determining
the father and child relationship: (1) by proof of one of the criteria
which establishes the presumption of the relationship; or (2) by a legal
action which results in a judicial determination of the existence or non-
existence of the relationship. The first presumption, under Section 621
of the Evidence Code, declares that the issue of a wife who is cohabit-
ing with her husband is conclusively presumed to be a child of the mar-
riage if the husband is neither impotent nor sterile. The other pertinent
presumptions are set forth in Civil Code Section 7004(a) and are rebut-
table presumptions which establish a parent-child relationship. These
presumptions arise if: (1) the man and the child's natural mother are
or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death or
a judicial action, or within 300 days after a decree of separation has
been entered; (2) the man and the natural mother attempted to marry
each other by a solemnized ceremony in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage has been or could be declared invalid,
so long as the child is born during the attempted marriage or within
300 days after its termination (or, if the marriage is void ab initio,
within 300 days after termination of cohabitation); (3) the man and
the natural mother have married, or attempt to marry each other after
the child's birth, provided that the man is named as the child's father
on the birth certificate with his consent or he is obligated to support
the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order; or (4)
the man receives the child into his home and openly holds the child out
as his natural child. The preceding presumptions, excepting the conclu-
sive presumption established by Evidence Code Section 621, may be re-
butted only by clear and convincing evidence, including, but not limited
to, a court decree establishing paternity of the child by another man.
If conflicting presumptions arise in a given case, Section 7004(b) pro-
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vides that policy considerations and logic control the choice of presump-
tions to be followed.
The husband of a woman who has received artificial insemination by
a licensed physician is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of the child thereby conceived, provided he has consented to such arti-
ficial insemination (§7005 (a)). Pursuant to this section, the husband's
written consent and certification of the spouse's signature and physici-
an's statement must be filed with the State Department of Health. The
donor of semen is specifically not to be regarded as the natural father
of such a child.
The second method for determination of the parent and child relation-
ship with respect to an alleged father is a legal action. When there is
a presumed father by reason of marriage or attempted marriage of the
natural parents, the action may be brought by the child, the natural
mother, or the man presumed to be the father (§7006(a)). For the
purpose of declaring the existence of the relationship, the action may
be brought at any time; for declaring the non-existence of the relation-
ship, it may be brought only within a reasonable time after the party
bringing the action obtained knowledge of relevant facts. Furthermore,
such an action may be brought before the birth of the child, if otherwise
appropriate. When there is a presumed father based on receipt of the
child into the father's home, any interested party may bring an action
at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or non-existence
of the relationship (§7006(b)). When there is no presumed father un-
der Section 7004 or if the child's presumed father is deceased, an action
to determine the existence of a relationship may be brought by the child,
the State Department of Health, the mother, the man alleged or alleging
to be the father, the personal representatives of the child, the mother
or alleged father, or by the respective parents of a mother or alleged
father who is deceased or a minor (§7006(c)). The district attorney
may also bring an action in any case in which he or she believes that
the interests of justice will be served thereby (§7006(f)).
Under Section 7008 the child must be made a party to the action,
and, if the child is a minor, he or she must be represented by a guardian
ad litem appointed by the court. The child's interest is isolated from
the interests of the parents by a provision that the mother or father may
not represent the child as guardian or otherwise. The mother, presumed
father, and alleged father may be made parties and must be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard. The child's interests are also protected
by Section 7006(2) (d), which provides that no agreement between ei-
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ther an alleged or presumed father and the mother or child will bar such
an action.
Section 7007 provides that a person who has sexual intercourse in
this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts for the purpose
of an action brought regarding a child who may have been conceived
by that act of intercourse. The action is to be brought in the superior
court of the county in which the child resides or is found, or, if the al-
leged father is deceased, the county in which probate proceedings of his
estate have been or could have been commenced. Under Section 7010,
judgments establishing the existence or non-existence of the parent-child
relationship, issued as a result of legal action under this Act, are de-
terminative for all purposes except criminal non-support cases. The
judgment may contain any appropriate provisions concerning the duty
of support, custody and guardianship, and visitation privileges.
Section 7012 provides for enforcement of obligations of the father,
provides for support payments to be made to the mother or other appro-
priate persons or agencies, and declares that wilful failure to obey the
judgment or order is an act of civil contempt of the court for which all
remedies for the enforcement of judgments apply. Section 7013 gives
the court continuing jurisdiction to modify a judgment or order. Section
7015 provides that an action to determine the existence or nonexistence
of a mother and child relationship may be brought by any interested
party and that, insofar as practicable, the provisions applicable to the
father and child relationship apply.
Under Section 7014 any hearing or trial under the Uniform Parentage
Act may be closed to the public, and all records, other than the final
judgment, are subject to inspection only upon order of the court for good
cause shown. In addition, Section 7016 provides that a written promise
to support a child from a presumed or alleged father does not require
consideration, and may, upon the promisor's request, be kept confiden-
tial by court order. The court may also designate an intermediary to
process payments to assure the confidentiality of the source.
Adoptions
Sections 224 and 7017 provide for parental rights relating to adoption
procedures. These sections provide that a child having a presumed
father may not be adopted without the consent of both parents except
under certain circumstances. The exceptions apply when the parent has
(1) failed to pay support or to communiate with the child for one years,
(2) been judicially deprived of custody and control, (3) voluntarily sur-
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rendered the right to custody and control in another judicial proceeding,
(4) deserted the child, or (5) previously consented to adoption of the
child. In addition, if a mother relinquishes a child for adoption and
there is a presumed father, the father must be given notice and has the
same right to object which a legitimate father possesses under previous
law (Chapter 2, commencing with §221), unless one of the above ex-
ceptions applies (§701 (a)).
If the child relinquished by the mother for adoption does not have
a presumed father, but does have an alleged father who has not in writ-
ing denied paternity, waived his right to notice, or voluntarily consented
to the adoption, the mother, person, or agency having custody of the
child shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the alleged
father. Pursuant to Civil Code Section 7017(f), every person identified
as the natural father or possible natural father must be given notice of
the proceeding. However, if such a father cannot be located or his
whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the court may issue an order dis-
pensing with notice to that person. If a man identified as a father or
a possible father fails to appear, or when appearing fails to claim cus-
todial rights, his parental rights are terminated.
If the alleged father appears and claims custodial rights, the court is
to determine the child's parentage and the alleged father's right to and
fitness for custody. However, Section 7017 (d) also states that the court
shall issue an order providing that only the mother's consent is required
for the adoption unless the alleged father can prove that he is a pre-
sumed father under Section 7004(a) (i.e. either that there was some
marital relation or attempted marital relation between himself and the
mother, or that he has previously received the child into his home and
held him or her out as his natural child). If the court, after inquiry,
is unable to identify any possible natural father, and no one has ap-
peared claiming to be the natural father and requesting custodial rights,
the court is authorized to terminate the unknown natural father's pa-
rental rights.
Probate
The Uniform Parentage Act as approved by the National Conference
did not incorporate probate provisions. Chapter 1244 incorporates into
the California Probate Code provisions which determine the rights of
succession on the basis of the existence of a parent and child relation-
ship, rather than on the marital status of the parents. Previously, Sec-
tion 225 of the Probate Code permitted an illegitimate child to inherit
only from and through his or her mother. If the child's father had ac-
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knowledged him or her in writing, the child could inherit from the
father, but could not inherit through the father unless the child's parents
had married after the child's birth and the father had acknowledged the
child.
Section 255 of the Probate Code has been rewritten by Chapter 1244
to provide that a child may inherit both from and through either parent
so long as each is a presumed parent under Section 7004(a) or have
had their parentage determined in a court action under Part 7 (com-
mencing with §700) of the Civil Code. In addition, the new law pro-
vides that the child's issue may inherit through the deceased child and
also that the parents, and all who would take an intestate share through
them, may succeed to the child's estate. For purposes of succession
under this section, the existence of a parent and child relationship must
have been established prior to the death of the decedent, and, where ap-
plicable, prior to the child's death.
Evidence
Changes in the Evidence Code as enacted by Chapter 1244 are de-
signed to conform to the Uniform Parentage Act by substituting the
term "parent and child relationship" for all references to legitimacy.
These changes occur mainly in exceptions to the hearsay rule whereby
evidence of a parent and child relationship may be introduced from prior
statements of a declarant who is unavailable as a witness, from family
books, charts, portraits, and the like, from church records, and from
other specified sources. The only substantive change in the Evidence
Code made by Chapter 1244 is that the chapter has added the exception
of sterility (discussed supra) to the conclusive presumption that children
of spouses who are living together are children of the marriage.
COMMENT
Although a number of minor changes were made, the California ver-
sion of the Uniform Parentage Act is substantially similar to the act ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1973 iii the Parentage Act with two exceptions. The first ex-
ception is that Chapter 1244 contains only one legal procedure for liti-
gating paternity issues-the formal court action. The national Uniform
Parentage Act contains an additional procedure-an informal pretrial
hearing agreed to by the parties-where it was hoped by the Commis-
sioners that many actions would be resolved, in order to "greatly reduce
the current high cost and inefficiency of paternity litigation" [National
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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Uniform Parentage Act, supra, at 337 (Commissioners' Prefatory
Notes)]. Under this procedure, if the parties refuse to attend an in-
formal hearing or if the hearing does not result in settlement, the action
proceeds to a formal civil trial. The National Uniform Parentage Act
also seeks to protect the mother from perjured testimony at the trial by
not allowing evidence which relates to an identified man having sexual
access to the mother at a time not related to the time of conception,
or to an unidentified man having such access at any time. This type
of evidence is permitted at the informal hearing. Chapter 1244 does
not incorporate the informal hearing procedure and does not limit ad-
mission at trial of evidence related to the mother's sexual accessability.
The second exception relates to evidence provisions generally. The
Commissioners considered evidence requirements of great significance
in their deliberations over the proposed Act. They not only set out dif-
fering sets of requirements as noted in the preceding paragraph, but they
listed specific types of evidence which were to be admissable. The most
controversial evidence provision permits the admission of blood test re-
sults which are inconclusive as to the non-paternity of the alleged father.
The Commissioners proposed these test results be weighed in accordance
with evidence, if available, of the statistical probability of the alleged
father's paternity [National Uniform Parentage Act, supra, § 12, Com-
ment at 348]. The California Act does not delineate evidence require-
ments.
Two possible constitutional issues, mentioned by the Commissioners
in their notes to the National Uniform Parentage Act and incorporated
into Chapter 1244, concern (1) the establishment of jurisdiction over
the alleged father, and (2) due process rights of the unknown natural
father. The jurisdiction provision, adopted verbatim by the California
Uniform Parentage Act (§7007 (b)), provides that "a person who has
sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to an action brought under this part with respect
to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse." A
possible rationale for this provision would be that the performance of
sexual intercourse by an individual is the performance within the state
of an act which gives rise to the cause of action. This rationale is de-
lineated in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws to cover situa-
tions in which the act which serves as the basis of jurisdiction gives rise
to a cause of action which is not in tort, with the proviso that such juris-
diction cannot be upheld if the nature of the act and the individual's
relationship to the state makes the exercise of such jurisdiction unreason-
able [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws §36(2) (1969)].
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The act of sexual intercourse as a basis of jurisdiction may be an im-
permissable extension of this theory.
The second constitutional issue discussed by the Commissioners re-
lates to the due process rights of unknown natural fathers or natural
fathers who are either non-locatable or whose whereabouts are non-as-
certainable, and whose parental rights are terminated when the mother
unilaterally relinquishes the child for adoption. The California Uni-
form Parentage Act provides that if the name of the father is unlMown
or his whereabouts are not ascertainable, the notice to him of the hearing
may be dispensed with. Notwithstanding this lack of notice, all of his
parental rights may be terminated. Whether this procedure is sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements of notice may be open to challenge
in light of the decision in Stanley v. Illinois [405 U.S. 645 (1972)],
which acknowledged the constitutional rights of unwed fathers to the
custody of their natural children [Id. at 655]. In Stanley, the Court
held that as a matter of due process, an unwed father was entitled to
"a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken
from him, and that by denying him a hearing and extending it to
all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged was
a denial of equal protection of the law" [Id. at 649].
Proponents of the Act, however, urge that the interests of the child and
of the adoptive parents require timely and final termination of the na-
tural father's parental rights and maintain that the notice provisions offer
adequate constitutional protection for the father combined with practical
considerations and fairness for the child and other interested parties.
An additional constitutional consideration stems from the amendment
of Evidence Code Section 621, stating that the issue of a wife who is
cohabiting with her husband is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage, if the husband is neither impotent nor sterile. A conclu-
sive presumption differs from a rebuttable presumption in that evidence
of facts and circumstances in a given case may not be introduced to
contradict it [WITKIMN, CALIFORNiA EVIDENCE, Conclusive Presump-
tions §296 (2d ed. 1966)]. This particular presumption, Evidence
Code Section 621, has been upheld by the California Supreme Court
as a substantive rule of law which cannot be said to be unconstitutional
unless it transcends the power of the legislature. The court felt the pre-
sumption was justified as an expression of social policy relating to the
family, in which it was felt the state has a legitimate interest [Kusior
v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 139, 140, 354 P.2d
657, 667, 668 (1960)]. However, in a series of recent cases, the
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United States Supreme Court has overturned several conclusive pre-
sumptions, stating that, "Es] tatutes creating permanent irrebuttable pre-
sumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments" [Vlandis v. Kline,412 U.S. 441,
446 (1973)]. In Stanley v. Illinois [405 U.S. 645 (1972)], the Court
overturned a conclusive presumption that unwed fathers were unfit for
custody and declared that "[t]he Constitution recognizes higher value
than speed and efficiency" [Id. at 656]. It therefore seems possible
that the retention of the conclusive presumption raised by Evidence
Code Section 621 will be subject to constitutional attack on the grounds
that due process does not permit adjudication of fights without the op-
portunity to introduce factual evidence contrary to the presumption.
See Generally:
I) NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY-SEcoND YEAR, July 26-
August 2, 1973, 339-358, Uniform Parentage Act.
2) Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (discusses a line of cases turning on analy-
sis of conclusive presumptions).
3) H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAw AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
4) Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIC. L. REv. 477 (1967).
Domestic Relations; relatives' responsibility
Welfare and Institutions Code Article 8 (commencing with § 12350)
(repealed); Article 8 (commencing with § 12350) (new).
SB 46 (Dills); STATS 1975, Ch 1136
Support: National Association of Social Workers; County of Sacra-
mento; Jewish Public Affairs Committee of California; California
Citizens Against the Double Taxation
Chapter 1136 has repealed the provisions of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code which previously required the adult children of a recipient
of aid to the aged under the state portion of the Supplemental Security
Income Program to make a monthly contribution to the state in support
or their aged parent [Former §§12350-12361, CAL. STATS. 1973, c.
1216, §37, at 2912-15]. These provisions have been replaced with a
prohibition upon (1) the imposition of a relatives' support requirement,
(2) any liability of relatives for medical and hospital care rendered to
recipients of aid, and (3) any threats of legal action by a county or by
a city and county against a relative for any support payment.
The portion of the Welfare and Institutions Code which has been
repealed by Chapter 1136 was a portion of the Welfare Reform Act of
1971 and was entitled the "Relatives' Responsibility Act." It authorized
the Director of the Department of Benefit Payments to set contribution
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levels subject to ceilings imposed by state law which varied according
to income level and the number of dependents in the adult child's family,
and to collect the monthly contribution. The repeal of these provisions
will result in a loss of support income directly received by some aged
recipients under former Welfare and Institutions Code Section 2352.
This section provided that in some cases a relative's contribution could
be passed along in part to the recipient parent when the recipient did
not claim the $20 per month unearned income he or she was permitted
before suffering a reduction in benefits.
COMMENT
The Relatives' Responsibility Act with its increased contribution levels
and enforcement provisions under the Welfare Reform Act of 1971
[CA.. STATS. 1971, c. 378, §1, at 1168] was a controversial law. Court
challenges and legislative efforts to amend and repeal the law questioned
whether it violated the due process rights of the contributing adult chil-
dren, what constituted appropriate support ceilings, and whether the
detrimental effect on family relationships outweighed fiscal benefits to
the state. In 1971 two cases [County of San Mateo v. Boss, 3 Cal.
3d 962, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654 (1971); Carleson v. Super.
Ct. of Sacramento County, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1068, 100 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1971)] challenged the relatives' responsibility provisions on equal pro-
tection grounds. The provisions were upheld, and in 1972 the legisla-
ture passed Senate Bill 42 [1972 Regular Session] which as introduced
would have repealed the Act and as later amended would have merely
lowered the support ceilings. The urgency clause of this legislation
stated: "A recent court decision has indicated that the new contribution
scale which went into effect October 1, 1971, has had a cruel impact
on the elderly, and caused financial hardship on adult children, particu-
larly those of lower income required by the act to pay increased support
to their parents. To provide relief as quickly as possible, this act must
go into effect immediately" [JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE
1248 (1972 Reg. Sess.)]. However former Governor Reagan vetoed
the legislation and the veto was not over-ridden. In 1973 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Relatives' Respon-
sibility Act in Swoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County [10 Cal.
3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973)], but the dissent
stressed the detrimental social effects of the Act [Id. at 511, 516 P.2d
at 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 150]. In 1973 the legislature passed Assem-
bly Bill 57 [1973 Regular Session] which also would have repealed the
Act, and again former Governor Reagan vetoed the legislation. Later
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in 1973, however, former Governor Reagan did sign Assembly Bill 134
[CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 1216, §37, at 2912-15 (implementing takeover
of the adult aid program by the federal government)] which contained
provisions reducing the contribution maximums and providing for state
administration of the responsibility law.
Legislative efforts to repeal this Act were successful in 1975 with the
enactment of Chapter 1136. The primary author of this legislation,
Senator Ralph Dills, claimed that loss of income to the state would be
minimal when collection costs were offset against sums collected [Sacra-
mento Bee, May 8, 1975, at A9, col. 1]. He also cited Department
of Benefit Payments estimates indicating that under the recent system
of state collection only one out of every six potentially liable adult chil-
dren actually contributed under the Act. In addition Senator Dills
claimed that the state agencies collecting the contributions under the law
resorted to illegal acts (such as sending threatening letters to elderly wel-
fare recipients to obtain the names of their children) in their collection
efforts [d.]. Consequently the Relatives' Responsibility Act has not
only been repealed by Chapter 1136, but an express provision has been
enacted forbidding the imposition of relatives' responsibility or any col-
lection effort for support contributions under this chapter by any city
or county.
See Generally:
1) Lopes, Filial Support and Family Solidarity, 6 PAC. LJ. 508 (1975).
2) 4 PAC. LJ., REvmw oF SELEcTFD 1972 CALwoRNu LGIs.ATON 432 (1973).
Domestic Relations; dissolution of marriage
Civil Code §4359 (amended).
SB 1194 (Stevens); STATS 1975, Ch 497
Support: State Bar of California
Section 4359 of the Civil Code has been amended by Chapter 497
to grant specific authority to superior court judges to issue ex parte or-
ders to restrain a party to a dissolution proceeding from molesting or
disturbing the peace of any persons who are in the custody of the other
party. Previous law granted judges the authority to issue such an ex
parte order to protect the other party in the dissolution proceeding, but
did not include a grant of authority for judges to issue such orders for
the protection of the persons under the care, custody, and control of the
protected party-usually the minor children of the marriage being dis-
solved. Chapter 497, by extending this authority, should assist in the
protection of children whose parents are involved in dissolution proceed-
ings.
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Domestic Relations; use of names by women
Civil Code §§4362, 4457 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure
§1279.5 (amended).
SB 555 (Marks); STATS 1975, Ch 1070
Opposition: Attorney General
Under prior law, a court, in a dissolution proceeding or a proceeding
to declare a marriage void or voidable, was permitted, pursuant to Civil
Code Sections 4362 and 4457, to restore the birth name or former name
of the wife. Chapter 1070 has amended these sections to require a court
in such proceedings to restore the birth or former name of the wife upon
her request. In addition, Chapter 1070 has amended these sections to
provide that the restoration of a wife's birth or former name may not
be denied because the wife has custody of a minor child who bears a
different name, or for any other reason exclusive of fraud. These latter
provisions come in the aftermath of In re Marriage of Banks [42 Cal.
App. 3d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1974)], where the court held that
the mere fact that the wife took custody of minor children in an action
for dissolution of the marriage was insufficient to support the denial of
the wife's request to change her name [Id. at 638, 117 Cal. Rptr. at
42].
Finally Chapter 1070 has amended Civil Code Sections 4362 and
4457, and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1279.5, to prohibit any per-
son engaged in any trade or business, or in the provision of any service,
from refusing to do business or provide a service, or to impose as a con-
dition of doing business or providing a service, a requirement that a
woman use any name other than her birth name or former name if she
has chosen to use such a name, regardless of her marital status. Many
retail businesses will not grant credit, for example, to a married woman
in her own name even if she has a steady job and an excellent credit
rating in her married name [Comment, The Discredited American
Woman: Sex Discrimination in Consumer Credit, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 61,
64 (1973)]. A violation of this provision could result in an award to
a successful plaintiff of compensatory damages pursuant to Civil Code
Section 3333, or injunctive relief pursuant to Civil Code Section 3422.
See Generally:
1) Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HAsT. L.J. 233 (1971) (a woman's right
to her name).
Domestic Relations; developmentally disabled adults
Health and Safety Code §38062.1 (new); §§416.19, 416.95, 38001,
38003, 38004, 38053, 38054.2, 38058, 38060, 38062, 38063,
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38103, 38104, 38106, 38110, 38120, 38121, 38122, 38123,
38200, 38201, 38205, 38255 (amended); Probate Code §1461.5
(amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §§6500, 6500.1, 7518,
10053.8 (amended).
AB 1421 (Lanterman); STATS 1975, Ch 694
Support: American Association on Mental Deficiency
Pursuant to the provisions of the Lanterman Developmental Disabili-
ties Services Act [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §38000 et seq.], an
adult is considered to be developmentally disabled if he or she suffers
from a developmental disability which originated prior to the age of 18
and is expected to continue indefinitely, and which constitutes a substan-
tial handicap to the individual (§38003(h)). Prior to the enactment
of Chapter 694, a developmental disability was defined as a disability
which was attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
or any other neurological handicapping condition closely related to men-
tal retardation [CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 546, §16, at 1053]. Chapter 694
has amended Section 38003 of the Health and Safety Code to provide
that developmental disabilities now additionally include any disability
which is closely related to mental retardation or which requires treat-
ment similar to that for mental retardation. In addition, persons dis-
abled by autism are now covered by provisions relating to the develop-
mentally disabled.
Provisions for the care and treatment of developmentally disabled per-
sons are included in the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services
Act [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §38000 et seq.], and Chapter 694
has been enacted to revise several of these provisions. Section 416.95 of
the Health and Safety Code and Section 1461.5 of the Probate Code
have been amended to provide that any developmentally disabled person
has a right to counsel in proceedings for the imposition of a guardianship
or conservatorship, and that the court must appoint counsel to represent
the proposed ward or conservatee in the proceedings if he or she is un-
able to afford an attorney. This change brings the provisions applicable
to developmentally disabled persons into conformity with provisions of
the Welfare and Institutions Code for imposition of a guardianship or
conservatorship for persons gravely disabled and subject to involuntary
commitment to mental health facilities pursuant to the Lanterman-Pe-
tris-Short Act (hereinafter referred to as the LPS Act) [CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §5365; see also REVIEW OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFOR-
NIA LEGISLATION, this volume at 333 (Civil Procedure; mentally disor-
dered persons) ].
Selected 1975 California Legislation
Domestic Relations
Section 6500.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code has been
amended by Chapter 694 to provide that any order for commitment of
developmentally disabled person expires automatically at the end of one
year, though a new petition may be filed to extend the period of hospi-
talization. This parallels the procedures of the LPS Act for commit-
ment of a gravely disabled person, which provide that LPS Act con-
servatorships require annual judicial review. This section now also spe-
cifically provides that any mentally retarded person has the right to
counsel (court appointed if necessary) in all proceedings for commit-
ment to a state hospital.
Furthermore, whenever a developmentally disabled person needs
medical or dental treatment and has no parent, guardian, or conservator
to consent to such treatment, the director of the regional center or a phy-
sician appointed by him or her in control of the developmentally dis-
abled person may give the necessary consent. Prior to the enactment
of Chapter 694, the director of the regional center was then required
to initiate proceedings for the appointment of a guardian or conservator.
The enactment of Chapter 694 makes the initiation of such proceedings
optional rather than mandatory [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§381101.
Amended Section 38104 of the Health and Safety Code also permits
any pregnant woman, irrespective of developmental disability status, to
receive genetic counseling services at regional centers if it is determined
that the woman has a high risk of delivering a defective or handicapped
infant due to a genetic disorder.
An additional change has been made by the amendment of Section
38120 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides the right to a hear-
ing by writ of habeas corpus to patients in a state hospital. The amend-
ment to this section made by Chapter 694 extends this right to patients
in community care facilities as well as those in state hospitals.
Finally, Chapter 694 amends Section 38004 of the Health and Safety
Code to provide that developmentally disabled persons may be released
from state hospitals and put under the authority of a regional center for
provisional placement in community care facilities or nursing homes.
This placement is to be for a period not exceeding six months and dur-
ing such a period of provisional placement, the developmentally disabled
person has an automatic right of return to the state hospital.
See Generally:
1) 5 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1973 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 361 (1974)
(prior legislation in this area).
2) 4 PAC. L.J., RE viEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALiFOuRNu LEGISLATON 438 (1973)
(rights of developmentally disabled persons).
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